An identity-based strong designated verifier signature scheme provides restricted verifiability only for a verifier designated by a signer and proper privacy for the signer.
I. Introduction
Relaxing the non-repudiation property of a standard digital signature, Jakobsson and others [1] introduced a specific type of signature for signer ambiguity, called designated verifier signature (DVS). A DVS scheme allows only a designated verifier to confirm validity of a given signature. This limited verifiability can be achieved by a sharing of signing capability between a signer and a designated verifier; in other words, a signature can be generated by not only a signer but also a designated verifier. When a designated verifier receives a signature from a signer, if the verifier did not generate the signature, the verifier is able to confirm that the signature is originated from the signer. Though anybody can publicly verify the validity of a signature, one cannot confirm the exact generator of this signature because both the signer and the verifier have signing capability. Here, the validity means that a signature has been generated either by a signer or by a designated verifier. This security property is formally known as non-transferability or simulatability [2] . In this sense, the nontransferability property provides signer ambiguity. An identitybased extension of a DVS scheme, say identity-based DVS (IBDVS) scheme, has been proposed to enjoy the benefit that an arbitrary public string such as an email address or a phone number may be used as a user's public key instead of requiring public key certificates [3] . IBDVS schemes have various cryptographic applications such as licensing software, auctions, and electronic voting.
However, in most practical scenarios, a designated verifier does not artificially generate a (designated verifier) signature for non-transferability using a simulation algorithm. Based on this belief, an adversary capturing a signature first transmitted
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Verifier Signatures with Self-Unverifiability JuHee Ki, Jung Yeon Hwang, DaeHun Nyang, Beom-Hwan Chang, Dong Hoon Lee, and Jong-in Lim from a party would imply that the signature originated from the sender, not a receiver, that is, a designated verifier. This helps the adversary to decide who made a signature and to collect critical information, such as the signer's intention. To remedy the privacy problem, a notion of strongness for a DVS scheme has been introduced [1] , [4] . Under this strongness notion, public verifiability on a DVS is no longer permitted. Instead, only a designated verifier can check the validity of a signature using his or her secret key.
To enhance the privacy of an IBDVS, we allege that even the signer must not be able to verify the validity of its own signatures unless the signer saves signatures in its storage. By this property, even the adversary who has a signer's secret key is not able to verify signatures. We call this privacy property self-unverifiability because even the signer itself cannot verify its own signatures, and the property will strictly separate capabilities of signing key and verifying key. This property is quite necessary because it is unfair to a verifier having the exclusive right to verify signatures when a signer mistakenly or intentionally loses its secret signing key to give the right to others who obtain the signing key. In reality, signers frequently lose their signing keys due to computer viruses, malicious software, misconfigurations of related systems, and lost/stolen portable devices. Therefore, without the self-unverifiability, a signer's poor management of its keys might infringe upon the designated verifier's exclusive right of verifiability.
To enhance the privacy of the signer by providing selfunverifiability, we propose a generic method that constructs strong IBDVS schemes with self-unverifiability as well as all the functionalities of IBDVS. We also prove the security of this method. Our design idea is to combine identity-based key encapsulation mechanism (IBKEM) and non-interactive identity-based key sharing (IBKS) schemes. In the generic method, we can flexibly and independently combine any pair of IBKEM and IBKS schemes irrespective of their underlying structures or hardness assumptions. For example, an integer factorization-based IBKEM and a pairing-based IBKS can be combined together. The IBKEM is used to achieve exclusive verifying capability, and the IBKS is used for signing. Accordingly, a designated verifier has two capabilities, decrypting (that is, verifying) and signing, and a signer has only the signing capability. In addition to flexibility, our scheme instantiated from the generic construction can output shorter signatures than that of existing schemes [5] , without adding computational overhead.
Various IBDVS schemes have been suggested to achieve strongness [5] - [7] . Several IBDVS schemes rely on a structure to hide a signature using a key that both a signer and a designated verifier (non-interactively) share [6] , [8] - [10] . The key can be computed using a signer's or verifier's static longterm secret key. Applying the notion of a keyed hash function to a DVS scheme, one of the schemes proposes a novel method to offer very short signatures [6] . However, these schemes fail to achieve self-unverifiability because they are based upon the static structure of an IBKS method.
One of the promising applications is virus-free software distribution, where a software company will provide validity of signatures for corresponding software but only to clients who buy this service [1] . Pirated software cannot be validated correctly, even when a legal buyer of the software sends it with his/her validation key, because the validation key can be used for generating the signature for the software modified for some malicious purpose.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section II, we briefly review the strong IBDVS schemes in [6] , [11] and show that these schemes have security vulnerability in terms of self-unverifiability. In section III, a formal security model is presented. In section IV, we propose a generic method of constructing an IBDVS scheme with self-unverifiability and prove the security of this method. Finally, in section V, we give concluding remarks.
II. Vulnerabilities in IBDVS Schemes
Using various cryptographic techniques, several IBDVS schemes have been suggested to achieve strongness in verifiability [5] - [7] . Some of them use a specific noninteractive IBKS method between a signer and a designated verifier [6] , [8] - [10] , where a key is computed with either a signer's or verifier's static long-term secret key and used for a keyed hash function.
We show that any IBDVS scheme that uses the specific structure does not have the self-unverifiability. To illustrate our idea, we briefly review the IBDVS scheme in [6] . The scheme is described as follows: -Setup. Let G and G T be additive and multiplicative groups, respectively. Let e: G×G→G T be a bilinear map, where G and G T have prime order q. Let P be a random generator of G, s(∈Z * q ) is chosen at random, and P pub =sP. To achieve the strong designated verifiability, the above IBDVS scheme takes a simple approach, which is to use a key (non-interactively) shared between a signer and a designated verifier to authenticate a message. This method can be viewed as a keyed hash function, that is, a standard MAC.
Although the scheme yields a short signature, the static structure of the IBKS is vulnerable to exposure of the signer's secret key. This can be easily checked as follows. Assume that an adversary F obtains a signer's secret key, sk ID A . For a given signature σ on a message m,
s and then check the validity of the signature by
A similar weakness exists in the recent IBDVS schemes [9] - [11] . As illustrated above, the weakness is mainly caused by a static structure of IBKS between a signer and a designated verifier.
III. Security Model for an IBDVS Scheme
In this section, we present a formal security model for an IBDVS scheme. In particular, we newly introduce a formal notion of self-unverifiability. , and then outputs the master secret key msk and its corresponding public parameters pp.
-KeyExtract(msk, ID). It takes as inputs the master secret key msk and an identity ID, and then outputs a private signing key sk ID .
-IDSign((sk S , ID V ), m). It takes as inputs a private signing key sk S , the identity of a designated verifier ID V , and a message m, and then outputs a signature σ.
-IDVrfy(σ, (ID S , sk V , ID V ), m). It takes as inputs a signature σ, the identities of a designated verifier and a signer (ID S , ID V ), a private signing key sk V , and a message m, and then outputs 1 (Valid) or 0 (Invalid).
Security Model
We consider three secuirty properties for an IBDVS scheme: unforgeability, non-transferability, and self-unverifiability. As noted in the literature [12] , unforgeability and nontransferability correspond to "unforgeability" and "anonymity" for a ring signature with a ring of two members, respectively.
Unforgeability. Informally, this notion means that any party who cannot access private keys of a signer and a designated verifier is not able to generate a signature. Next, we formally define the notion of unforgeability.
An IBDVS scheme ∑ is said to be existentially unforgeable under chosen identity-message attacks (CIMA) if no probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary F has a nonnegligible advantage in the following game: For a security parameter k, a challenger C runs SetUp to obtain the master secret key msk and its corresponding public parameters pp; an adversary F gets the public parameters; and the adversary F is allowed to access to the following Sign, Extract, and IDVrfy oracles to make polynomially-many queries adaptively. Here, "adaptively" means that a query may depend on answers to the previous queries.
-Sign. On a query <(
-Extract. On a query <ID>, return sk ID ←KeyExtract(msk, ID).
-IDVrfy. On a query <σ, (
F succeeds in the above game if the following two conditions hold; i) any of ID S and ID V has not been queried to Extract oracle and ii) the ((ID S , ID V ), m') tuple is not the same as any of the tuples queried to Sign oracle. The event of the success is denoted by Suc Forg . The EUF-CIMA advantage of F for ∑ is defined by Adv F, ∑
Non-transferability. Informally, non-transferability means that any third party except a signer and a designated verifier cannot identify the real generator of a DVS. An IBDVS scheme ∑ is said non-transferable if there exists no PPT adversary that has a non-negligible advantage to distinguish the distribution of signatures generated from real executions of the scheme (with a secret signing key) and that of signatures from the simulator Sim. Here, Sim takes as input ((ID S , sk V ), m), and then outputs a simulated signature. More specifically, we consider the following game: For a security parameter k, a challenger C runs SetUp to obtain the master secret key msk and its corresponding public parameters pp; an adversary F gets the public parameters; and the adversary F is given access to the following oracles to make polynomially-many queries adaptively. Here, "adaptively" means that a query may depend on answers to the previous queries.
-Sign. On a query <(ID S , ID V ), m>, return σ'←Sign(sk S , ID V , m).
When F submits ((ID S , ID V ), m) as a challenge, the challenger C picks a bit b∈{0, 1} uniformly at random. If b=0, then return σ←Sign(sk S , ID V , m); otherwise, return σ←Sim((ID S , sk V ), m). The signature σ is given to the adversary F. Finally, F outputs a guess bit b'.
F succeeds in the above game if b=b'. The event of the success is denoted by Suc NT . The advantage of F for ∑ is defined by Adv F, ∑
Alternatively, we can define this notion using the "anonymity" for a ring signature with a ring of two members [12] .
Self-unverifiability. The notion of signature privacy means that the validity of a signature associated with a designated verifier should be confirmed only with the designated verifier's secret key, where the adversary does not have an access to the signing key. This notion is also known as strongness in the literature [1] , [4] . To enhance the signature privacy, we introduce a stronger notion called self-unverifiability that allows an adversary to access even a signing key. In other words, self-unverifiability captures that the validity of a signature associated with a designated verifier should be confirmed only with the designated verifier's secret key, even when a signing key to be used to generate the signature is exposed in the future. As shown in section II, some IBDVS schemes achieve only signature privacy, not self-unverifiability. Next, we formally define this notion.
For a security parameter k, a challenger C runs SetUp to obtain the master secret key msk and its corresponding public parameters pp. An adversary F gets the public parameters. The adversary F is given access to the following oracles to make polynomially-many queries adaptively. Here, "adaptively" means that a query may depend on answers to the previous queries.
When F submits ((ID S , ID V ), m, m') as a challenge, the challenger C picks a bit b∈{0, 1} uniformly at random. If b=0, then return σ←Sign(sk S , ID V , m); otherwise, return σ←Sign(sk S , ID V , m'). The signature σ is given to the adversary F. We assume that F is already aware of the private signing key sk S by querying ID S to Extract oracle. Finally, F outputs a guess bit b'.
F succeeds in the above game if (1) b=b', (2) ID V has never been queried to Extract oracle, and (3) IV. Our Generic Approach for Self-Unverifiability
To overcome the problem presented in section II, we propose a generic method based on an IBKEM scheme and a noninteractive two-party IBKS scheme. An IBKEM scheme is an identity-based variant of an ordinary KEM [13] , [14] .
Two Cryptographic Primitives
Before describing our method in detail, we first review an IBKEM scheme [14] and a non-interactive two-party IBKS scheme that are used as the building blocks for our construction.
An IBKEM scheme consists of four algorithms: KEMSetup, KEM-Ext, KEM-Enc, and KEM-Dec.
-KEM-Setup. It takes as input a security parameter 1 k , and then outputs a master secret key msk KEM and its corresponding public parameter pp KEM . K D is a plaintext space associated with pp KEM .
-KEM-Ext. It takes as inputs the master secret key msk KEM and an identity ID, and then outputs a secret key sk KEM,ID .
-KEM-Enc. It is a PPT algorithm that on inputs of pp KEM and an identity ID outputs a random 'one-time' key k D ∈K D and its ciphertext θ.
-KEM-Dec. It is a deterministic algorithm that on inputs of a private key sk KEM,ID and a ciphertext θ outputs a key k D .
Basically, it is required that an IBKEM scheme should satisfy the correctness, that is, for given (msk KEM 
We say that an IBKEM scheme IBKEM is semantically-secure if no PPT adversary can gain a non-negligible advantage to guess a bit b for given k b , θ, where ID) , b is a randomly selected bit, and if b=0, then k b =k D ; otherwise, if b=1, k b is a random number. Here, we assume that ID is chosen by an adversary.
Many identity-based encryption schemes can be represented in the IBKEM/DEM framework [14] . As an example for an IBKEM scheme, we can consider the Boneh-Franklin KEM [15] , where KEM-Enc is defined by (k D =e(Q ID , P pub ) r , θ=rP)← KEM-Enc(pp KEM , ID) for random r∈Z * q . A (non-interactive) two-party IBKS scheme consists of three algorithms: KS-Setup, KS-Ext, and sKS.
-KS-Setup. It takes as input a security parameter 1 k and then outputs a master secret key msk KS and its corresponding public parameter pp KS .
-KS-Ext. It takes as inputs the master secret key msk KS and an identity ID and then outputs a secret key sk KS,ID .
-sKS. It is a deterministic algorithm that takes as inputs a user U S 's secret key sk KS,ID S and a user U V 's public identity ID V and then outputs a key TK. The algorithm has symmetry of computation for the participants. That is, given the user U V 's secret key sk KS,ID V and the user U S 's public identity ID S , it outputs the same key TK. That is, TK=sKS(ID V , sk KS,ID S ) =sKS(ID S , sk KS,ID V ).
Basically, it is required that an IBKS scheme should satisfy the correctness; that is, for any ID V and ID S ,
We say that an IBKS scheme IBKS is key-indistinguishable if no PPT adversary can gain a non-negligible advantage in the following experiment with a simulator S: Initially, S sets up system parameters for IBKS and gives the resulting public parameters to the adversary F. Also, a secret key is properly defined for each user. Next, S simulates an attack environment for the IBKS scheme by providing Execute and Reveal queries. The adversary F can get transcripts of an honest execution of IBKS or a common key computed from an execution of IBKS according to queries. When F issues Test query for a pair of two identities, (ID 1 , ID 2 ), S returns a value K b after selecting a random bit b∈{0, 1}, where K 0 is a key generated from an honest execution of IBKS with (ID 1 , ID 2 ) and K 1 is a random number selected from a key space.
In contrast to normal IBKS schemes [16] , the above IBKS scheme does not require any communication between two participants for sharing a key. As an example for a noninteractive IBKS scheme, we can consider the two-party IBKS scheme in [16] , [17] , which is essentially the same as that in the previous section in that a shared key in the IBKS is defined by e(Q ID V , sk KS,ID S )=e(Q ID V , Q ID S ) s =e(sk KS,ID V , Q ID S ).
Construction
We present a generic way to construct an IBDVS scheme with self-unverifiability as follows: Assume that an IBKEM scheme IBKEM=(KEM-Setup, KEM-Ext, KEM-Enc, KEMDec) and a non-interactive two-party IBKS scheme IBKS=(KS-Setup, KS-Ext, sKS) are given. Let H:{0, 1}
λ be a cryptographic hash function. In the above construction, the use of the keys, k D and TK, are intended to provide two security properties. The key k D is used to achieve the self-unverifiability, which means that exposure of a signer's secret key does not compromise a MAC key η, which is used in generation of a signature. Obviously, it will be intractable to compute the key η=H(k D , TK) because it will be intractable to compute k D without knowledge of sk ID V if the semantic security of a given IBKEM is guaranteed. The key TK is used to achieve unforgeability against outside attackers except a signer and a designated verifier.
In Fig. 1 , we show a schematic diagram for our generic construction of an IBDVS from an IBKEM scheme and a noninteractive two-party IBKS scheme. Remark 1. We note that our generic approach intrinsically provides delegatability [18] , which can be used for delegating signing capability. In other words, if a long static key TK shared between a sender and a receiver is given to a delegate, he or she can make a signature on behalf of the signer. 
Security
We prove that the IBDVS scheme constructed above achieves existential-unforgeability, non-transferability, and selfunverifiability. Theorem 1. If a given IBKS scheme is keyindistinguishable, then the above IBDVS scheme is existentially unforgeable in the random oracle model.
Proof. We show that we can build an efficient distinguisher D attacking the key-indistinguishability of the underlying IBKS scheme by using a PPT forger F attacking the IBDVS scheme constructed from the generic method.
Assume that the distinguisher D is given a public parameter pp KS . Also, assume that q E and q S are the numbers of Extract and Sign queries that an adversary can make to Extract and Sign oracles, respectively. D first picks α and β uniformly from {1,…, q E +q S } for two target identities that F will output as a final forgery. Let , and then gets back a challenge value K b , where K 0 is a key generated from an honest execution of the given IBKS scheme with (ID 1 , ID 2 ) and K 1 is a random number selected from a key space. The goal of the distinguisher D correctly guesses the bit b by running F as a sub-algorithm.
The distinguisher D provides F with a simulation environment for the unforgeability game as follows: Let F G ⇒π denote the event that an adversary F outputs a forgery π in this unforgeability game; assume that an adversary F makes q S , q E , and q V queries to the Sign, Extract, and IDVrfy oracles, respectively; and we also assume that hash queries are never repeated.
The challenger D first runs the SetUp algorithm of IBKEM to generate the master secret key msk KEM , then check the validity of the given query by using the pre-images of σ=(θ, τ) and return b. does not occur if α and β are correctly guessed because the remaining parameters are identically distributed, and there will be no meaningful relation among random hash outputs and signatures except the given challenge key TK. The probability of the correct guess is Pr[∼Abort]≤2/q E (q E -1). If the given challenge TK is correct, that is, TK=sKS(ID V , sk KS,ID S ), then the presented simulation is perfect. This means that forging on the target identities was successful and the resulting forgery was valid at least with the advantage of the forger. However, if TK was a random key, then the forger would get a negligible advantage in forging on the target identities. Proof. We show that there exists a simulator Sim such that no PPT adversary has a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing the distribution of signatures generated from real executions of the constructed IBDVS scheme with a signing key and that from the simulator Sim with a designated verifier's secret key. Define Sim by
where for a message m∈{0, 1} and  τ←H(η, θ, m) . By the correctness property of the given twoparty IBKS scheme, we have that TK=sKS(ID S , sk KS,ID V ) =sKS(ID V , sk KS,ID S ). So, the distribution of TK is identical in both Sim and IDSign algorithms. In addition, since the simulator uses the same KEM-Enc as in IDSign, the distribution of (k D , θ) is also identical in the Sim and IDSign algorithms. Therefore, η←H(k D , TK) and τ←H(η, θ, m) are identically distributed in the Sim and IDSign algorithms. □ Theorem 3. If a given IBKEM scheme is semantically secure, then the above IBDVS scheme achieves selfunverifiability in the random oracle model.
Proof. We show that an IBDVS scheme constructed from the generic method presented above achieves self-unverifiability, that is, any PPT adversary gets a negligible advantage in the game for self-unverifiability, which is defined in section III.2. Using the so-called game-playing technique [19] , we prove this theorem by considering a sequence of games. The first game is defined for the original self-unverifiability model, and the second game is defined as a modification of the first game, where a random key k r instead of k D computed in KEM-Enc is used to generate a signature for testing an adversary. For convenience, we denote by G0 and G1 the first and the second game in the random oracle, respectively. To complete the proof, we will show that any PPT adversary gets a negligible advantage in the second game, and G0 and G1 are identical except a negligible distribution. Let F G ⇒b CG denote the event that an adversary F outputs a correct bit b in game G∈{G0, G1}. In the games, we assume that an adversary makes q S , q E , and q V queries to the Sign, Extract, and IDVrfy oracles, respectively. We also assume that hash queries are never repeated. The game G0 is the original unforgeability game, which is defined in section III.2 with our specific IBDVS scheme. Next, we define the game more concretely. A challenger C runs the SetUp algorithm, that is, the Setup algorithms for IBKEM and IBKS to generate the master secret key msk=(msk KEM τ←H(η, θ, m) . Finally, return σ←(θ, τ) .
-IDVrfy. On a query <σ, (ID S , ID V ), m>, return b←IDVrfy
When F submits ((ID S , ID V ), m, m') as a challenge, the challenger C picks a bit b∈{0, 1} uniformly at random. If b=0, then return σ←Sign(sk S , ID V , m). Else if b=1, choose a random message m' and then return σ←Sign(sk S , ID V , m'). The signature σ is given to the adversary F. We assume that F is already aware of the private signing key sk S by querying ID S to Extract oracle. Finally, F outputs a guess bit b'.
The game G1 is modified from the original game G0 regarding the Sign and Extract oracle queries. The modification is described as follows:
-Sign. We show that an adversary has a negligible advantage in distinguishing G0 and G1. Game G0 defines k D as the first component of sKS(ID V , sk KS,ID S ), while game G1 defines it as a random key. Note that the other parameters of the two games are identically distributed. By assumption, the underlying IBKEM is semantically-secure. Let ε IBKEM be the (maximum) advantage of an adversary attacking the IBKEM with respect to the semantic-security. We have Pr[F
G0
⇒b CG ]-Pr[F
G1
⇒b CG ]
Next, we show that an adversary F succeeds, that is, guesses correctly the challenge bit b in the game G1 with negligible probability. A signature is defined as a hash output in the game G1. In the presented simulation of the random hash function H, it is easy to see that the hash outputs are distributed uniformly at random. Furthermore, the random key k D is completely unknown from the viewpoint of the adversary by construction. There is no meaningful relation among hash outputs and so signatures. So, the adversary is able to guess the random key with probability 1/γ, where γ is the size of the key space associated with the IBKEM. Typically, for security, γ should be sufficiently large, and so 1/γ is negligible.
Therefore, summing up the above results, we have
⇒b CG ]≤ ε IBKEM +1/γ, that is, an adversary has a negligible advantage in the self-unverifiability game. 
Instance
To illustrate that our method is effective, we present an example that uses the Boneh-Franklin IBKEM scheme with symmetric bilinear maps [15] and the non-interactive IBKS scheme [17] . The example is described as follows:
-Setup. Let G be an additive group and G T a multiplicative group. Let e: G×G→G T be a symmetric bilinear map, where G and G T have prime order q. P is a random generator of G. Figure 2 shows a concrete instance from our generic construction method using Boneh-Franklin's IBKEM [15] and the non-interactive two-party IBKS scheme of [17] .
As shown in [17] , the non-interactive IBKS is semanticallysecure under the hardness of the decisional bilinear Diffie- Hellman (DBDH) problem, which is one to distinguish whether t=abc or not, for given (P, aP, bP, cP, e(P, P) t ), where e: G×G→G T is a bilinear map, P is a random generator of G, and a, b, c∈Z * q . So, the above scheme achieves unforgeability by theorem 1. In addition, as shown in [15] , [20] , BonehFranklin's IBKEM is semantically-secure under the hardness of the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman (CBDH) problem, which is one to compute t=abc or not, for given (P, aP, bP, cP), and so the DBDH problem. This implies our instance satisfies self-unverifiability by theorem 3.
Remark 2. A simple combination between two-party identity-based authenticated key agreement schemes [16] and a keyed hash function would not achieve the self-unverifiability of an IBDVS scheme. There is a difference between the security models of our IBDVS scheme and the simple combination scheme. An adversary breaking the selfunverifiability is not allowed to access a designated verifier's secret key in the security model of our IBDVS scheme but can access the secret key in that of the simple combination scheme. In addition, in contrast to key agreement schemes that typically permit interactive communication between participants, a standard IBDVS scheme should be constructed by one-way transmission from a signer.
Comparative Analysis
In this subsection, we compare our scheme in section IV.4 with recent IBDVS schemes in terms of signature length and amount of computation. In this analysis, the hash function H is assumed to output a 160-bit value, that is, λ=160. Our strong IBDVS scheme yields a short signature of which length is almost half of that of the recent strong IBDVS scheme [5] . The DVS scheme of [5] uses a symmetric bilinear pairing map as our scheme. Thus, when 80-bit security level is considered, the 512-bit representation for an element of G and the 1,024-bit representation for an element of G T should be required for the symmetric bilinear map [14] , [16] , [21] . Since a signature of [5] consists of an element in G T , the bit-length of [5] is 1,024 bits while the bit-length of our signature is 672 bits because our signature consists of an element in G and a hash output. [6] does not support self-unverifiability and so is vulnerable to the signer key compromise.
In Table 1 , P and E G represents a pairing computation and a scalar multiplication of the group G, respectively. As shown in Table 1 , the computation overhead of our scheme is the same as that of [5] . Finally, when more efficient IBKEM and IBKS are developed, we can simply replace them to obtain more efficient IBDVS with self-unverifiability.
V. Conclusion
We first showed that several recent strong IBDVS schemes do not achieve the self-unverifiability, that is, exposure of a signer's secret keys infringes the designated verifier's exclusive right of verifiability. To overcome the problem, we proposed a generic method to construct IBDVS schemes with the selfunverifiability by combining an identity-based key encapsulation mechanism and a non-interactive identity-based key sharing scheme. Our method instantiates an IBDVS scheme that provides self-unverifiability with short signatures.
In the future, we intend to investigate the construction of an efficient IBDVS with non-delegatability [23] or with more rigorous security notions [24] .
